Test Papers / Previous Question Papers of IGNOU BNS109A English and Human Factors June 2005

DIPLOMA IN NAUTICAL SCIENCE

Term-End Examination

June, 2005

BNS-109 (A): QUALIFYING PAPER
(ENGLISH AND HUMAN FACTORS)

Time: 2 hours
Maximum Marks : 100

1. (a) Describe personal charcteristics which will both assist and hinder performance of a deck cadet on board. (250 words) (10)

(b) What are the 'elements' of effective communication and why is it important on board ? (10)

2. (a) "A chain is only as strong as the weakest link." Explain the above statement in terms of teamwork and describe how team work can help in safe and efficient functioning on board. You may support your answer with practical examples. (200 - 250 words) (10)

(b) List 10 items to be checked/action to be taken, prior to arrival on port. (10)

3. (a) Choose the word closest in meaning to the given word, from those given in brackets : (10)

(i) Cargo (baggage, attend, carry, bear)
(ii) Cadet (cadre, cajole, trainee, caddy)
(iii) Monitor (inspect, check, supervise, money)
(iv) Economics (designing, placing, studying, proper arrangement)
(v) Anchor (support, hold, hook, boat)

(b) Choose the word farthest in meaning from the given word, from those given in brackets : (10)

(i) Sunny (wet, hot, windy, cloudy)
(ii) Bad (good, fine, important, terrible)
(iii) Happy (content, joyous, sad, moody)
(v) Liquid (hard, soft, smooth, solid)
(v) Fast (dull, slow, pause, turn)

4. Replace the underlined words with the corrected form. (20) The effect off wind in sea-level, and therefore at tidal heights and at times is vary variable and depends on typography of the area in question. For general it can be asked that the wind will rise the sea level in the direction towards which it is blowing. A weak wind blowing straight on shore should pile up the air and course high water to be higher than predicted result in a positive surge. While winds blowing of the lend will have the revise effect and the level of the see can be lower than the predicted leavels. This affect, known as a negative surge, is of great unimportance to very large vessels.

5. Write a short essay on any one of the following : 20

(i) Tsunami - causes and after-effects
(ii) Tidal waves -causes and after-effects
(iii) Hurricanes - causes and after-effects

6. Please carefully read the reportl of a collision below and answer the questions that follow.

This is a report of an accident, for which the immediate cause was human error but where there were a number of latent causes associated with the environment, equipment failure, and system layout and bridge resource management.

As a high-sided RO-RO passenger ferry was in the final turn to starboard on passage to her berth, in 35 to 40 knot winds, and passing close to a moored vessel, an inappropriate helm order was given by the master, which was not noticed by the other members of the bridge team. Shortly before the collision one of the two bow thrusters had tripped out and could not be brought back into operation immediately, the lack of which reduced control authority.

At the time of the accident the master had the con and stood at the central control console from where he had a good view forward horizontally and down to the bow, but did not have a clear view of the vessels moored to starboard. The engine and thruster controls were within easy reach. The layout of the console did not allow one person to operate helm, engine and thruster controls from a single position. He could also not see the panoramic Rudder Angle Indicator (RAI) without taking a step back. He was steering the vessel with verbal helm orders which were repeated back to him by the helmsman. Control was therefore split (verbal and direct) and the master became overloaded and gave an inappropriate verbal order. He lost situational awareness, and was unaware of the rudder position in the time betwreen giving the order and the collision.

The chief officer was standing forward of the starboard bridge-wing manoeuvring console, from where he had a good view forward and aft down the vessel's starboard side, but where sight of the engine and thruster controls was awkward, and sight of the RAI could only be achieved by changing position. He was about 14 metres from the master, such that he was not in his direct line of sight. He could shout advice to the master and could, if he listened carefully, hear the helm oders given by the master and repeated by the helmsman.

The report concludes that the way that the bridge team was deployed, and the ergonomics of the instrumentation on the ferry, meant that monitoring of the master's actions (by the chief officer and the helmsman) and those of the helmsman (by the chief officer and the master) was difficult and not effective, because the master did not have easy sight of on RAI from his conning position, and the chief officer could neither hear the orders easily nor easily see an RAI.